CONTENTS

I.
Introduction 1
II.
The Defense Budget Process 5
III. The Political Economy of Defense 23
iV.
Conclusion 31
Glossary of Terms 33
Selected Bibliography on Civil-Military Relations 37 Tables and Figures   Table I 
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite a long tradition of political stability in the U.S. civil-military relationship, the debate between the U.S. military establishment and elected officials has been described by many analysts, policyniakers and military officials as troubled, contentious and mistrustful.
Stepping away from the internal vagaries of the U.S. political process, however, one is struck by how relatively cooperative the civil-military relationship has actually been over time, when compared to such relationships in other countries.' This paper highiight-one key ingredient in this basicaiiy stable civil-military relationship in the United States; consideration of the annual budget of the Department of Defense (DoD) and its projected five-year fiscal plan. for national defense. 2 Though there are many other dimensions of the relationship between the U.S. military and civilian leadership, virtually all of them are played out through the defense budget. The defense budget is a mechanism for setting priorities between the administration and the military services and among the services themselvcs. Defense policies are reflected in the budget, which provides the resources to implement those policies.' Hardware choices are only possible with budgetary funding. Troops are trained aad exercised, bases built and sustained, and ships sailed with the resources provided in the defense budget.
The underlying miessage of this primer is that dcbate and compromise in the development of the annual defense budget can encourage long-term stability and a broad degree of consensus on defense policy, the roles of civilian and military leaders, and their expectations of each other. Through this process, the military services express their For one discussion of civil-military relations in the United Slates, see Samuel P. Huntington, 77te Common Defense (New Yoik: Columbia University Press, 1966). preferences and civilian leaders in the executive branch cxercise their authority. Elected legislators use the budget debate to fashion their own role in military policy and conduct oversight of the activities of the military services and the Pentagon. In the Uni:2d States, the defense budget is at the very heart of civil-military relations; it is the communications medium linking military policyniakers with elected representatives.
Bitter disputes between Congress and the Department of Defense over the budget are often in the headlines, creating the impression that the civil-military relationship is uncooperative and antagonistic. While there are often important differences between the budget requested by the Pentagon and the one passed by the congressional committees, most of the defense budget is non-controversial. One rece;vt study found that the majority of line items in the president's defense budget request are accepted without revision by the House and Senate Amied Services committees and the House and Senate Appropriations committees. 4 While the more than two-year process of elaborating the U.S. defense budget is arduous and often contentious, its ultimate impact, over time, is to enhance the stability of the civil-nmilitary relationship.
This paper examines crucial ingredients of the defense budget process in the United States: the steps and timing of wiat process in the executive branch and Congress, the historic role of civilian control in the executive branch, the flow of information on the budget to Congress, the extent and manner in which Congress alters the defense budget reqtuest, the "political economy" of the defense budget as it affects Congress, and the role of mediating/inforniation institutions in the defense budget process.5
Viewed in a comparative perspective, the U.S. political process may provide valuable lessons, both positive and negative, for nations with more troubled civil-military relations. Problems in this relationship can lead to a total breakdown in communications and disruption of the civil order.' The creation of stable democracies in other nations depends on many factors, not tile least being strong, equitable economic growth. A stable civil-military relationship is another ingredient of a strong demnocracy; perhaps sonic lessons may be learned from the U.S. experience which Would help facilitate trust and understanding between these two critical sets of actors in other societies.
At the start some caveats arc in order, lcst it be thought that the U.S. defense budget process could simply be transplarted to othc: countries. 'lhc idiosyncracies of U.S. defense budgeting are linked, in part, to the idiosyncracies of American politics. One crucial difference between the United States and other countries is that the Amcrican structure of government is not parliamentary, in which the parliamentary majority selects the c.Cecutive. In recent U.S. ', )ry, Congress and the White House have most often been controlled bdifferent parties; c ilition-building, therefore, is a basic requirement for securing legislative approvai Jf an cx, utive branch budget proposal. The president's party cannot be automatically relied upon to provide a majority for the budget in Congress. In fact, except for the four years of the Carter Administration, the president's party has not commanded a majority in both chambers of Congress since 1968.
Another distinguishing feature of U.S. politics is 'transparency' with respect to the disclosure of government information. A privately-owned press and a strong political/cultural preference for making public more, rather than less, information on government activities prevent the creation of laws --such as the British Official Secrets Act -which would deter disclosure of defense and national security information, and consequently hinder debate. Americans, in general, mistrust their government, weak as it is by comparison with other governments, especially in the wake ef the Vietnam War and the Watergate incident. Demand for public disclosure and policy deates occur at levels that sometimcs bewilder policyiakers in other nations. This condition of transparency in information gives ordinmry citizens and professional defense analysts the ability to track U.S. defense spending in great detail and helps deter both military and civilian defense budget participants from subverting the process.
Still another key ingredient of American politics is the constitutional basis of legislative responsibility for defense budgeting. According to the Constitution, Congrcss must be involved in the defense budget process since "Congress shall have the power ... to provide for the common dlefense of the United States ....
[including the power] to raise and support armies, . . . to provide and maintain a navy, . . . land] to make riles for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. 0 While other countries require their legislative branch to review the defense budget, the U.S. Congress may be unique in its ability to make significant changes in the budget request.
Like its counterparts in other countries, the U.S. military is often suspicious of elected officials' involvement in the inner sanctum of defense policy. Yet, they recognize that funding for military programs and missions cannot simply be taken for granted; it must be raised through public debate over the purposes for which ii is to be spent. Thus, defense budgets are, to some extent, influenced by a consensus built between reprcsentative government and mili itary planners.
It is also important to note that the history of the U.S. civil-military relationship has not been static or non-controversial. Ther• are times when the military has held civilian legislative leadership at arms lcng~'h, such as during the 1991 Gulf War, and times when Congress has felt at odds with the mnilitary, such as in the debates over the conduct of the Vietnam War.
By and large, however, the preparation of the defense budget and its progress through Congress have served as consensus-building processes, enhancing stability in civil-military relationw by developing agreement between legislators and the military." Over time, this stability has allowed the development of some degree of understanding and trust between civilian political institutions and the military in the United States. T1iis und-,rstanding is an important ingredient in creating a political context in which military coups arc virtually unimaginable, while ensuring that resources of some magnitude continue to flow to national defense purposes.
THE DEFENSE BUDGET PROCESS
Before World War I1, the United States spent relatively little on defense, preferring to rely on geographic isolation from potential enemies and a small standing military for protection. Assumption of a much more global role after World War !I and the Cold War rivalry witlh the Soviet Union, however, led to much higher, sustained levels of defense spending. Defense budgets have been in the $200-300 billion range during most of the postWorld War II period, surging past $300 billion during the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, and during the Reagan Administration's peacetime defense buildup in the 1980s (see Table I and Figure 1) .9 This funding supports the personnel, operations, weapons programis and research of the four U.S. military services -Arnmy, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps -as well as the activities of a number of overarching defense agencies and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (see Figure 11) .''
To understand the civil-military relationship through which this budget is defined and approved, it is best to begin with the executive branch -the Pentagon and Ilie White House. Within the executive branch, annual defense budgets are prepared by the military services, reviewed within the Pentagon by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and by the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and, finally, submitted to Congress for debate, amendment and approval.
9Thtmse defense figures include '1ll spinaing for the U.S. antiea forces arid the fe-derally fiunded, state-run National Guard. Thiey do lint include police forces, ititertal security agenlcies, btoder,.i patrols, veterans tenefits or pension pay-ouls, which aite sometimes included in other countries' defense budgets. budget plans are drawn up for the target fiscal year, as well as for the following budget year.1 2 In addition, the services assembie additional years of planning data, much of which is ultimately provided to Congress." 3 Even at this early stage, however, the process is not untouched by civilian leadership. The decisions made in previous years by the Pentagon and Congress have created a preexisting framework within which the military forecasts future budgets; the past drives the present and the future. Moreover, as the four military services prepare their budget plans, civilian staff of OMB participate in internal Pentagon discussions, having the opportunity to communicate White House preferences and receiving early indications of service desires.' 4 Even in the early stages of budget preparation, the services must begin setting priorities and accepting funding trade-offs between personnel, operations and maintenance, research and hardware acquisition.
In the executive branch defense budget process, the central civilian actor is the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The evolution of this civilian authority has a long hisory. Before 1947, as the Constitution suggests, two agencies dealt with defense budgeting -the War Department (Army) and the Navy Department, each administered by a civilian secretary. There was no separate Air Force and ,o overarching Secretar) of Defense. One of the lessons uf the Second World War was the need for an integrating agency, leading to the creation of the Department of Defense in 1947 (and, incidentally, a new Department of the Air Force within the Department of Defense, based on the former Army Air Corps).
Military service budget planning covers the funding requirements of military personnel, operations and maintenance, procurement, research and development, military Figure I1 1 Tea ..-E -.
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construction, family housing and stock funds. 5 Table II This entire process, which precedes any formal White House or congressional consideration of the defense budget, involves voluminous data analysis and endless, lengthy internal meetings and discussions. There is ample opportunity in this process for elements of the decisions under consideration to be disclosed anonymously to Congress or to the media, thus involving civilian leadeiship in the debate. In fact, it is sometimes in the interests of the advocates of a particular program to leak important information in order to stimulate support for, or opposition to, a course of action being considered within a service.
For example, in the FY 1992-93 budget planning process, it became known that the Department of the Navy was considering requesting funding for r.-.w F-14D aircraft, though that program haoi been terminated in the FY 1990 budget."' The function fulfilled by making such information public c. ~u to mobilize the opponents of the program to prevent such a decision. In either case, the ultimate budget submission to CQngress did not request any new F-14Cs, despite the rumor that the Navy desired them. In this way, constituencies outside the Department of Defense become an important part of the process of consensus-building for defense, even before formal budget submission.
The history of defense budgeting since 1947 has involved constant tension and interaction between the Secretary of Defense and both the civilian and military leadership of the military services. With respect to the budget, perhaps the most significant benchmark was the creation of the Planning, l'rogramming and Budgeting System (PPBS) under Secretary McNamara and his expansion of the capabilities of the Office of the Secretary to review and make final decisions on the budgetary desires of the services." 8 Since these decisions involve resource allocation, they are critical to service autonomy, and are the primary spending limits on services.
The ebb and flow of this relationship can be loosely described as one of :;ecretary dominance during the 1.960s, gradual reassertion of military service dominance in the 1970s, clear service dominance in the 1980s, and some return in the direction of the Office nf the Secretary of Defense apparent in the 1990s." 9
Despite the complexities of this budgeting relationship, however, the military services clearly accept the reality that the civilian secretary plays a central role in the resource allocation process in any given a'.Aiinistration. There appears to be a complementary recognition within the Office of the Secretary that the military services have the principal responsibility for resource planning, with major decisions about overall funding levels and sonic programs being made by the secretary and OSD staff. This relationship is never free of tension, ar even sonic mistrust, but there is also a certain predictability to the process and a general agreement on the "rules of the game" inside the Pentagon.
The executive branch process is finalized within the White House, where the defense budget is reviewed by the national security staff of OMB. This staff scrutinizes items still in disagreement, raises questions about program ..ecisions, and integrates the DoD budget request into the overall presidential budget. Here, considerations external to the desires of the military services or the Department of Defense can enter into the defense budget process. programs or spending levels and seek changes. 0 Once these disagreements have been resolved, the budget is then submitted to Congress, usually nine months ahead of the fiscal year which it is intended to fund.
White House control with respect to civilian involvement in the defense budget is somewhat more tenuous. The authority of OMB, in particular, has varied over the years. Consideration by OMB is one of the stages in the process where the trade-offs between defense and non-defense spending must be considered. This office had significant authority over defense resource levels and even sonic resource decisions in the 1970s, but the message was clearly communicated in the early 1980s that resources would be generous for defense and OMB would not scrutinize programs in much detail.2' The end of the Cold War and 14 severe budget constraints in the 1990s may give OMB greater authority in future defense spending decisions.
Since the 1940s, when dcfcnsc spending began to reach consistently high levels, the United States has not had aa administration which could truly be said to be hostile to the military or to military spending, thus narrowing the parameters within which civil-military tension, occur in the executive branch. In general, civilian control of defense budgeting exists in the executive branch, while much of the detailed budget planning is left to the military and decisions on major programs and budget levels are made at the civilian level. 22 
Congressional Considwration of the Defense Budget
The submission of the Pentagon's budget request to Congress sets the framework for debating defense spending and policy. The budget lays out the policies, programs and funding levels for natim,,al defense, providing Congress with the opportunity for hearings and debate over national defense issues. The congressional process for handling the defense budget is illustrated in Figure 111 .
What is striking about the role of elected legislators in the defense budget process is the staggering volume of information they receive on the budget. Observers from other countries are often overwhelmed by the amount of information published b, the administration on the defense budget, including the OMB budget document; an annual report by the Secretary of Defcnse; detailed descriptions and cost data on major weapon programs, research and development, military construction, and operations and maintenance programs; itemization of military constluction projects; detailed data on the composition of the military forces; a volume of financial data on DoD spending; an annual volume of historical data on DoD spending covering more than 40 years; and a variety of specialized briefing sheets and publications, all in the public domain.
Moreover, Congress anld its defense committccs receive all this data and classified docunmentation justifying the Defense Department's budget requests in addition to unclassified and classified briefings aud testimony from a stream of witnesses from the Department of Defcnsc and the military services. Despite the suspicion that may exist between the military and Congrc-,s, by contrast with the military of virtually any other country in the world the Pentagon is a veritable font of information. From the start, Congress faces less of a problem Figure III a E 0 ferreting out secrets from the Pentagon than it does sifting through the volumec of data to separate the important from thc insignificant. 23 'This transparency of information about the defense budget influences both civilian and military participants in the process. Military planners know their requests must make sonie sense to the ordinary taxpayer who will read about thenm in the newspaper, Members of Congress know they cannot lobby for favored weapons projeccts in total secrecy. The Decpartmnict of Defense holds twicc weekly briefings in an effort to satisfy thle constant demands of the press to be fully informed of up-to-the--minrute developments in U.S. defense policy.
The formal institutions and process through which Congrcss carries out its constitutional responsibilities for the defense budgct have become cimplex over the past 200 years. Congressionkil committees play the key role in this process. The Appropriations committees of the House and Senate have primary responsibility for approving expenditures." 4 Since the 1960s, the Armed Services committees of the two chambers have also beconme makjor participants iii the defense budget process, authorizing funding for specific prograrns.2-After 1974, a third layer of congressional review was created, the BudCget State University 1'iess 1906). Until the 1960s. tire ArmedI Serv ices committees authorized pgrlpmns for thle Decpartment of D~efense, bill dIid not pass onl funding levels for those programs. Thew Air Force wouldI be authorized to purchase a particular numlber of aircraft, but lthe, approval of funds for those aircraft was the task of the Appropriations Committee. Inl thle 1900s, thre ArmedI Services committees gradually cxtended theil coilsiHera t ionl of 1`tinduiig, making it heceessary for Ammue( Services to "authorize anr appropriation," whichi Would subseq 1 uently be "alppriopriate(l" by the Appropriations commitees. ý' Thre House has 4'.5 members, thle. Senate 100. In tire 102nd Congress (1991 -92) the D)efense App~ropriations subcommittees containe(1 131 (8 D~emocrats and S Republicans) members inl the House andl 18 (10 1)cmnocrats andi 8 Republicans) members in lthe Se:nate (Thle full Appropriations Committees inlcluded'( 59 members inl thre H-ouse andl 29 members inl thre Senate.) 'flie Armedl Services committees had 54 (33 Democrats andI 21 Republicans) members inl the liouse and 2-0 (11 )emnocrats and 9 Republicans) members inl lthe Senatle. Thle Budget committees hadI 37 members inl the House (23 lDemnocrats andl 14 Republicans) !tid 21 in lthe Senate (12 1)emocrats andI 1. Repuiblicans). Membership on! these thryee commilittees dfoes not ovem lapl greatly.
Nudget rcqucst arnd approves overall ftunding levels for 13 "funcetions" of thle federal budget. including "nlationalI defense." ,27
In termns of proccss, thle Budget Committees receive the federal budget and approve a resolution, Which thle House and Senate subsequently debate and vote voon, setting an overall level for defense expenditures (or "budget authority"). This overall leme1 i.-then communicated to the authorizing (Armied Servicecs) and appropriating (Appropriations) comminttccs as the ceiling under which thcy should work." 8 The Budget cominittees can and do debate defense policy and spending levels, but they do not approve any specific personnel or weapon programs line items. By virtue of their authority to set overall levels, however, tile Budget comnmittees canl constrain the choices other committees make Oil thle defense budget. More rcccntly, as a result of thc Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990, thle Budget committees' influence h~as been significantly reduced because the BlEA predetermiined the level of defense spending for FY 1991-93.2' Thle Armecd Services and Appropriations committees begin their scrutiny of the defense budget at the same time as the Budget Committee and in considlerab~ly greater dectail. T1hey hecar pUblic and classified testinony and review Pentagon documentation. Thec Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of thle. Joint Chiefs generally present tile initial budget request to these committees, followed by a stream of witnesses from the Comptroller's office, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, thle secretaries (civilian) and chief-, (military) of the services, the commanders of thec unified and specified commands, as well as heads of defense agencies and the (directors of specific military prograrns.:() Many of the same witnesses testify before all fou: comminueies. 3 Generally working under the ceilings imiposed by the Budget commilittees, thle Aimed Services commilittees review this testimony and the budget submissions and "mark upl" (approve) their version of the Defense Authorization Act, first in subcommittee andl then in full committee. For the Arimel Services committees, this act covers funding dlecisions on 2rlme national diefense function includes nlot only the D~efenise 1)cpar-tilcnm budget. bitl nu1clear weaponls activities of thle Deparitment of Eneigy. [he lwpartment of Einrgy, which succeeded the earlier Atomlic: Energy Commission inl thle federal bu1reauicracy, Conducts all research and produ~ctiont activity onl nuclear warheads for the military.
"2 Ill tile pioccss of1 prepaitug this resoluitionl, the Buudget commilittees seek informal guidance fiom.In auliorizeri. specific programs., ats well as a wide varicty of legislative provisions rC(uestilig specific items of action by the Department of Defense or reports to Co-.Srcss within the following year. For example, thc comminittee has inl the past required the Department of Defense to puttchase coal for troops, based in Germany from supplier,; in thle state of 1-ennsylvaiuia, and required reports onl futurc plans for strategic nuckear forces. None of these committees, however, is able. to pcrfforn at comprehensive review of the entire budget. They also arc unable to continuously review progress inl it program year-to-year, instead picking tand choosing each year which programs they will fully review.
Both thle I-louse and Senate Armed Services conmmittees pass a bil!, and with it, issue a committee report explaining the bill's provisions. This bill is theun debated and voted upon in each chamiber. That debate andl vote generally cover a rangec of issues from ovcrall funding to decisions Onl specific programs, based onl amendments to the bill proposed by individuals or groups of members. Generally, however, thle Cham111bers Only review a few of thle decisions made inl comimittee, Once each chamber has passed a Defense Authorization Act, the differences between thle two versions must be reconciled through a "conference" of representatives of the two Armed Services committees, leading to a "conference report' and yet anothecr vote onl tile floor of each chamber. Often the Conference canl involve significant differences in the spending priorities of the two committees with the finial numbers coming out somewhere between the higher levels set by tite typically more conservative Senate Armed Servicecs Committee and the lowecr levels se( by tile House Armied Services Committee.
Trhis bill, howevevr, only authorizes funding, it does not appropriate the actual funds for (lefenlse prOgramls, a responsibility which belongs to the Appropriat ions Commit tees. Theii work starts with Defense Suhconmmittec heari migs and] markup, tol lowe'd by) full Appropriations Committee markup. lollow~iqg congressionial rules, the House must lct first. holding a floor * vote oil thce committee bill and then reporting it to the Senate. wvhich inevitably Changes thle -~ appropriation to suit its owl) commnittee decisions and floor vote. This leads to another conference and subsequent vote onl the conference report. Defenrse appropriator generally defer to the authorizers onl specific programniatic decisions, seldom adding onl spending, butt sometimes curtailing programls fisca-lly h appropriations process pays little attention to legislative and reporting rcquiremetuits associated with tile budget, but significant attention to thle specific, individual funtding decisions-Onl defenlse programs.
As this brief description of the congressionial proccss suggests, mutch of the c. ivilmilitary tension over the defen1Se btditd OcCCUr at tile level of thle congressional defense budget process. Givenl thle wide array of attitudes toward fihe military to be found inl ,Congrss tile L]Cglree to which thle Structures and thle. relationship haveN-functioned successfully over time is surprising. A closer examination of some key ingredlienlts of this processsuggests thle reasons for this success.
Changing the Defense Budgel Request
The will of Congress with respect to defense spending is reflected ill the changes it makes in the budgct. Despite assertions that Congress irresponsibly drives defense budgets sharply tip or down, historically Congress has made only marginal changes in the requested level of total defentse spending. For example, while congressional action decreased the DoD budget request seven times and increaiscd it four times between 1960 and 1970, in only four of those years was thie change larger than 1.7 percent, with the largest change being a 7.49 percent decrcase in FY 1970W2 In the 1980s, despitc major debate over the level of cdeaese spending, Congress approved more than 95 percent of tile defense funds requested by the admtinistration. 3 " Congress does, however, alter the details in the defense budget, leading to frequent tdlegations of "micromanagement" by thie military services, who are conccrned about congressional intrusion into the details of defcnsc managemcnt."' Over recent decades, Congress and its committees have repeatedly added, deleted and changed prograi . added reporting requirements, delayed program decisions, and in a variety of ways "meduled" ill the details of defense planning in a way that could arouse the ire of the most democraticallyinclincd military officer. For example, ill tile 1991 congressional debate over supplemental (additional) funding for the Gulf War, the House Appropriations ComimlittCe added language to the bill demanding that the D)epartment of Defense continue to manufaclure F-141) aircraft (d1spite Navy desires to terminate the contract for the program) and insisted that two ContrIctor Sources Con1tinue to ne Ilaintail!ed for pIroduc'iion of thie Tl'omahawk missllc.-Such apparent civilian intrusions ill defense planning are more subtle than they appear., however, since the military are often involved ill the vcry changes Congress is accused of making. For example, since 1990, the Secretary of D)efense has attempted to eliminate funding for the V-22 Osprey, a new verticil/horizontal cargo and passenger aircraft for tile Marine Corps. Congress regularly has refused, restoring researchl and production funding Coniventional system typically occur, n)ot because CoOfiress wi'nts to eliminate a pm~all but b~ecausc it seeks to apply the funlds to another purpose.
Despitc thle tensions over such changes through most of thce past 415 yecars, the bugt-r disagreeme1nts, and discussions bietween Coriiress andl tile. lPntagoin have f~ckised onl prograin details and not fundamental (differences about the roles and missions of the military. While there have beent Congressional members and caucuses favoring deep cuts inl thle defenlse budget, I dramatic overhlaul of roles anld missions, anld the elimination of wecapons programs, and others w"ho favor r~apid growth mid increased programl fuindi n tineit her has Commandcd a M iic Rosent 1L Ill thle dehatte ovet tile FY 1992 (1cfenlse budget. tile 11-2 hotnhibe neatly pvrvetd to hic all exceptionl to t00% ulle. though. despite long, ald deep Congilessional opjxositionl. this $6 Nlo~ll t -on gi aml has Contintued to teceivt Iuiidiing. Pm eviouls mua~jos Cancel llationls -thle 11.-Ill honiem 09 7T), thle OI~VA1/scigczaiim 'Voim all defense gun (0985) and the. X-12 attack-hombet (1991) -.-havc all hent cam tied omr., bhy III, Dqp:4'mI tIn of tDe fenseC it'sclf, mio" Conllless. majority. Instead, decisions are generally made on the middle ground, many of them in committees and a few on the floor. 39 This pattern of compromise reflects a long history of imeraction between the military and the key committees in Congress. That interaction has strengthened the moderates on defense in Congress, permitting both sides to win some legislative battles, while losing others, but agreeing to live with the outcome.'
The strength of this centrist consensus could well be tested in the 1990s. The disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, and virtual dissolution of the former Soviet military combine to eliminate the "threat" which has provided an underlying source of congressional/executive agreement. U.S. military roles and missions are under the kind of full-scale review and revision which has only one precedent -the beginning of the Cold War in the late 1940s. It remains to be seen how Congress and the executive branch will elaborate a new consensus on U.S. forces and defense budgets for the post-Cold War era. The process for this discussion, however, will involve the same interaction: consideration of the defense budget, which in the past has produced a package that each side has been able to accept. "T9 he Congressional Black Caucus, for e:.atnple, led on this issue by Representative Ronald V. l)ellums (I)-CA), has for more than a decade sought deep reductions in defense budgets; its floor amendments (i.e. proposals presented to the entire Congress for a vote) to that cffect are generally supp))led by less than 25 percent of the House of Representatives. Supporters of strategic defcnse have generally sought funding at least at the level requested by the l)et.artment of i)efense, but have failed in that effort for several years now. There is also a Congressional Military Reform Caucus made uip of memnlbers who arc interested in improving our conventional defenses and the defense procurement process. The Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus, which supilIrts arms tontrol, Provides information to members interested in foreign and military pxolicy, but takes ino organizational Position on legislation.
4o This consensus is clearly a swinging Pendulum, however. Secretary of D)efense Caspar Weinberger, for example, refused -some felt stubbornly -to accommodate congressional pressures for slower growth in the defense budget, a refusal which may have co:tributte, to relativey sharp congressional reductions ill Wq;inberger's budget requests after FY 1985. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, a former member of Congress. appears io have restored some comity in the relationship between Congress antd the Pentagon. For recent • :on-1prehensive congressiona! statements on roles and missions, see Senator Sam Nunn, Nunn, 1990.: 
III. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEFENSE
In the United States, this civil-military relationship is further strengthened, and a middle ground often reached, because of the degree to which defense spending issues are also important local and state issues for House and Senate members. 4 " Unlike m.nty other countries with parliamentary systems, where national political majorities can dominate the individual representation of local interests, the porous and relatively undisciplined nature of Congress permits and even encourages members to promote and defend the political, social and economic interests of the district or state they represent.
This local quality oi debate and representation covers most areas of public policy, but is especially evident with respect to defense. The Department of Defense purchases roughly 75 percent of all the goods and services bought by the federal government from the private sector and maintains a nationwide network of military bases and supply and administrative operations. 42 Although the overall importance of defense spending to the national economy has declined sharply over the past four decades, defense decisions can have important local, corporate and employment impacts 43 (see Figure IV and Table V) . This complex political economy is sometimes described as a "military-industrial complex." However, the decline irn the importance of defense spending for the overall economy suggests that this "complex" does not hold the kind of national political sway implied. The political economy of defense, however, does play an important role in creating a complex, but stable framework for civil-military relations. To describe local impacts as a reflection of the "pork barrel" side of the defense budget only captures one dimension of this political complexity.
It is certainly true that the presence of a major base or defense contractor in a district makes the protection of that base or contractor important to the long-term political survival of a member of Congress.' Many defense decisions in Congress can be linked, in part, to an individual member's interests. Although the military services often complain that weapon programs and basing decisions reflect such parochial corporate, community or employment concerns, these efforts are not necessarily sufficient to guarantee a program's survival. In the debates over the FY 1991 , FY 1992 and FY 1993 defense budgets, a number of hardware programs have ended or been targeted for termination, despite the negative local political and economic consequences of such decisions. These programs include the AH-64 Apache helicopter, M-1 tank, M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, F-15E fighter, B-2 stealth bomber, Scawolf submarine and even the F-14D. These decisions are all being driven by shrinking defense resources. Thus, these terminations, despite their local economic importance, may be slowed, but cannot be avoided.
The political economy of defense spending is complex. The military services, which arc acutely aware of the local politics of defense decisions, have used such knowledge to increase support for some programs. For example, the Air Force and the prime contractor (LA)ckheed) for the C-5 cargo aircraft coordinated lobbying activity in the early 1980s in order to encourage support for new C-5B funding from Congress.46
What these interactions show is not that defense decisions flow from pork rather than from policy, but that pork and policy are inevitably mixed in the debate over the defense budget. Although many defense budget decisions are outside such political considerations, the long history of contentious budget debates over bases and hardware programs makes it clear that such a mix exists. 4 7 What is important for the purposes of understanding civilmilitary relations in the United States is that policy and local interest are intertwined and that both elected and military representatives arc conscious of this connection. The relationship has its negative consequences: some bases are kept open, although rationally they should close, and some contracts are extended or approved that sihould be terminated. 48 It also has its positive consequences for the functioning of the civil-military relationship, smoothing understanding and reenforcing a consensus in the defense budget debate.
The impact of this political economy on the defense debate is difficult to measure. 49 Not all military hardware programs or bases exist simply because of it; clearly, national security considerations continue to drive defense planning. Nor is it easy to separate the two: one member's "pork" is another member's "critical requirement for American national security." Moreover, it is certain that once actual combat has tested military deployment or hardware capabilities, what once was "pork" may have become a vital ingredient of American defense .5
Media( ing/lIniormational Institutions for Congress
The interaction between the Pentagon and Congress over the defense budget is further strengthened and reenforced by a number of mediating institutions. Besides the formal interactions bc•ween congressional committees and the services, a number of less formal institutions exist to fill critical information needs for Congress and ensure constant interaction between Congress and the Department of Defense over the defense budget.
Perhaps most importantly, by contrast with the experience of most other countries, Congress has an ample supply of staff expertise on .lefensc matters, both for individual members and for the defense committees, as well as a variety of research institutions "4' No U.S. bases were closed for ten years between 1978 and 1988, in !erge part because Congress resisted such decisions. However, the 1988 Base Closing Commission managed to decide on the closure of more than 20 major U.S. defense installations, in large part because its decisions were presented as a package to Congress, which had approved, in advance, a procedure req'Iiring the rejection of the entire package for any one propm:ial to fail. This process was repeated in 1991, with the creation of another base-closing commission, which led to the closure of 34 additional bases and the realignment of 
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reporting to Congress on defense matters.i Most individual members, especially those involved with defense committees, have at least one staff person with sole or partial responsibility for defense. Each of the committees reviewing the defense budget has defense staff -minimal for the Budget Committee, but numerous for the Amied Services and Defense Appropriations committees. These committee staff arc often people with military or defense policy experience who sometimes move back and forth between the Pentagon and Congress. 52 The possession of a skii!ed, experienced staff ensures that members of Congress, especially on the key committees, have their own capability to assess defense budgets independently of the Pentagon.
This independent capability has been substantially reenforced by the existence of a number of governmental research and auditing institutions which report to Congr2ss on defense matters, including the budget. For years, the Gerteral Accounting Office, an auditing arm of Congress, has conducted close scrutiny of defense budgets and spending through its National Security and International Affairs Division. The Congressional Research Service also maintains a staff capable of researching defense budget issues for Congress. The 1974 Budget and Impoundmcnt Act created still another organization, the Congressional Budget Office, which includes a well-staffed National Security Division to research budget proposals and options in the defense arena for Congress. Most recently, the congressional Office of Technology Assessment has begun to analyze defense policy issues for the Congress. These different, often overlapping, research capacities significantly strengthen the ability of Congress to analyze and understand defense budget issues independently of the Department of Defense. By strengthening Congress, they help balance DoD control over information resources.
There is yet another important network which facilitates civil-military relations and provides information on defense budgets and spending options: the vast array of private and nonprofit think tanks and research and policy groups. many of them scrutinize the DoD budget request closely and provide Congress and the Pentagon with their views. 53 In addition, these groups conduct forums and seminars where researchers, members and staff of Congress, and defense officials meet to discuss budgetary and policy issues, providing the opportunity for contact, socialization and exchange of information. There are also organizations which actually lobby for defense policies through grassroots mobilization and congressional campaigns. These groups include the American Defense Lobby, American Security Council, Couacil for a Livable World, Physicians for Social Responsibility, SANE/FREEZE: Campaign for New Priorities, Union of Concerned Scientists, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Women's Action for New Directions and many others.
The military services themselves also maintain constant communication with legislators through congressional liaison offices within the Pentagon (to respond to congressional inquiries) and extensions of those offices on Capitol Hill (to brief Congress on budget and peicy issues and respond to congressional needs). A tour of duty in one of these offices is considered a valuable part of training for career advancement in the military. In addition, a number of job exchanges and fellowships exist to provide congressional work experience to DoD civilian and military employees. Similarly, military veterans who go on to become congressional staff or members of Congress provide important links between Congress and Department of Defense.
Finally, there is one other key, outside institution which informs congressional consideration of the defense budget: an independent press, including a substantial "trade press" devoted to specialized coverage of defense matters. Well-informed, consistent coverage of the significant flow of defense information and of congressional debate informs that debate, translates arcane data into accessible language for policymakers, and serves as an informational beltway between Congress, the executive branch and the defense analytical community.s4
Communication is the key to all of these networks. Exchange of information and access to data contribute to an atmosphere of general trust between the elected and military part of the government. 
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IV. CONCLUSION
Despite persistent conflict and disagreement between civilian policyniakers and the military in the United States, this relationship has been remarkably stable. The process of creating, debating and approving the defense budget has been an important element in developing that stability. Policy and program differences are mediated through the budget discussions. The keys to this process are information and a willingness to compromise.
Within the executive branch, there has been a gradual accumulation of capability and authority in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, allowing that office to "manage" relationships within the military. Each side has its responsibilities and there appears to be general agreement on the rules of the game. At the White House level, there is less detailed intervention in the budget process, but clearly a capability to do so, if desired, through OMB. Since the United States has almost never had an administration whose defense policies could be considered "anti-military," there has not been the kind of tension over policy and budgetary issues which can be found in other countries.
Potentially the most difficult civil-military relationship in the American political structure is between Congress and the services. Despite a wide range of congressional views on defense, however, even this relationship has remained fairly stable. Here, too, with ample information and a willingness to compromise, the budget process plays a key role. Congress receives voluminous data on the budget, programs and policies of the Department of Defense and has a key role as public reviewer of this data. ;s an institution, it has a complex, interactive process for reviewing that budget in detail.
Congressional will is exercised through changes in the budget submission. These modifications have, historically, been minor with respect to the total resources for defense, but major when it comes to programmatic decisions, although Congress almost never completely terminates a defense program. Even hece, compromise seems to prevail. The center of the congressional political spectrum has few fundamental differences with the military when it conies to roles and missions.
The centrist consensus oil defense in Congress is reenforced by the political economy of defense spending. The importance of programs and military bases to the districts of individual mcmbers can temper the views of even the strongest oppouint of the military. While this intertwining of politics and policy is sometimes criticized as a source of waste and spending, and poor program decisions, it may actually provide a healthy basis for negotiations over defense plans and for stable rclationships between elected representatives and the military services.
The civil-military relationship with respect to Congress is further reenforced by the ample supply of expertise and information on defense budget and policy matters available to Congress. This expertise comes from member and committee staff, congressional research institutions, a vast network of private sector research centers and even from military representatives charged with congressional liaison missions.
Defense budgets provide an important framework within which U.S. civil-military relationships are negotiated. The transferability of this experience to other countries is less clear. The absence of a parliamentary majority system in the United States makes such consensus-building necessary, reenforcing the tendency toward compromise. A societal preference for disclosure of information on government activities encourages a generous supply of data on defense, primarily delivered through the budget, Moreover, there is a consensus, based on the Constitution, that the civil side of American government has ai mmndatcd role in the funding of military activities.
What may be transferrable are the attitudes of information-sharing and compromise, whose impact will depend on the political structures and expectations in other countries. It seems clear that more generous information and discussion can moderate conflicts and create the terrain for agreement, over the long term. Such agreement, in turn, can reenforce the strength of democratic government.
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Appropriation -One form of budget authority provided by Congress permitting fcderal agencies to incur obligations and to make oay.ents out of the Treasury for specific purposes. An appropriation is the most common means of providing budget authority and usually follows the passage of an authorization.
Appropriation Title -The most general category in the defense budget as approved by Congress. Major defense titles include military personnel; operations and maintenance; procurement; research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E); military construction; family housing; and revolving and management funds. Appropriation titles are divided into budget activities or line items.
Authorization -Legislation that establish or maintains a government program or agency by defining its scope and that usually sets a specific limit on how much Congress can appropriate for that program. Authorizing legislation is nonrally a prerequisite for appropriation. An authorization does not make money available.
Baseline -Generally, a projection of federal revenues and spending under a specific scenario. This projection is used as a benchmark against which to measure the effects of proposed changes in taxes and spending, but is not a forecast of future budgets.
Budget Authority -The authority granted to a federal agency in an appropriations bill to enter into commitments which result in future spending. Budget authority is not necessarily the amount of money an agency or department actually will spend during a fiscal year, but merely the upper limit on the amount of new spending commitments it can make. Budget Resolution -Legislation passed by Congress that establishes the congressional budget level for thc fiscal year. This resolution is expc~tedI to pass by April 15 and estab~lishes bindinig figures for the aggregate levels of budget authority for cach of thc budget functions. A budget resolution does not require thle presidecnt's signature.
Constant Dollars -A measure of the dollar value of gow!-and servies adtiustcd for inflation, C.uistaint dlollars arc calculated by dliv iding current doiiars by an appropriate price index, in a process called "deflating."
Current Dollars -T'he (dollar valuc of goods and services as mecasured in prevailing prices at the ltilc thc goods we're sold or servies renidered.
Defense Planning Guidance -The Defense Departmecnt document which provides the basic usifcatonfor Dol) programs andl budgets, and provides general guidance to thie servicecs and defense agencies Onl tilc developmient of their Program Objective Memoranda. Mark-Up -The process by which members of a committee or sub~committee approve, amend or rejeci p~rovis ions iii proposedl legislat ion.
Outlays -Actual dollar amount spent for a particular activity. Total outlays in a given year result from both new budget authority provided ill that year an1d from unexpended balances of budget authority remaining from p-evious years.
Outycar -In general usage, any of the fiscal years that follow the budget ycar. For example, the 1021d Congress convened in January 1992, and debated the FY 1993 budget. Tlhis means that the current year is fiscal 1992, the budget year is fiscal 1993, and the outycars are 1994 and beyond.
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System1 (PPBS) -A formalized process developCd by Secretary of Defense Robert McNatmara in the 1960s that consists of a planning phase focusing on developing the Defense Policy Guidance and general assessments of threats, force requirements, strategy and resources; a programming phase in which tile services calculate tile numbers and types of forces needed to satisfy the Defense Planning Guidance; and a budgeting phase where the financial requirements of DoD programs are finalized and approved by the Secretary of Defense.
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) -Detailed list of proposed programs submitted by the Anry, Navy and Air Force to the Department of Defense in response to the requireme;",s in the Defense Planning Guidance.
Rescission -An action of the president that cancels previous1y' appropriated budget authority. A proposed rescission must be reported to Congress by the president in a rescission message. If both houses do not approve tile proposed rescission within ,15 days, the president must obligate the budget authority as it was intended I'y Congress.
Supplemental Appropriation -A legislative act appropriating funds in addition to tile regular annual appropriations. Supplemental appropriations are supposed to be enacted when the need for additional funds is too urgent to be postponed until tile next regular appropriation is consi(lered, although they are often enacted for other reasons as well.
Unobligated Balance -The amount of budget authority previously granted to an agency in an appropriation that has not yet been committed to a project, thereby continuing to be available for future obiigation and spending.
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